More than a month since war erupted in the Middle East, UN agencies confirmed on Tuesday that huge numbers of people have returned to Syria from Lebanon “exhausted, traumatized and with very, very few belongings”. Meanwhile, the UN International Maritime Organization said that another vessel has been attacked in the Strait of Hormuz, increasing concerns of further delays in transporting lifesaving aid. The Security Council met in New York in emergency session on Lebanon. Stay with us for live updates. App users can follow coverage here

The UN’s top humanitarian official warned the Security Council on Tuesday that Lebanon is facing one of its most dangerous moments in years, with escalating violence, mass displacement and deepening human suffering pushing the country to “breaking point”.

An hour after Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó returned to Budapest from St. Petersburg on August 30, 2024, he received a phone call from his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov.

Lavrov told Szijjártó he had been quoted all over the Russian media following his visit.

“Did I say something wrong?” Szijjártó asked.

“No, no, no.” Lavrov reassured him. “They were just saying that you are pragmatically fighting for the interests of your country.”

In fact, Lavrov was calling to make a request: The Russian oligarch Alisher Usmanov was looking to have his sister, Gulbahor Ismailova, removed from EU sanctions lists, and Szijjártó had promised to help.

“I’m calling on the request of Alisher and he just asked me to remind you that you were doing something about his sister,” Lavrov said.

“Yeah, absolutely,” Szijjártó answered. “The thing is the following: Together with the Slovaks we are submitting a proposal to the European Union to delist her. We will submit it next week, and as the new review period is going to be started, it’s gonna be put on the agenda and we will do our best in order to get her off.”

Lavrov expressed his appreciation for Szijjártó’s “support and … fight for equality in all fields.”

From there conversation proceeded to the two men’s shared disdain of the European Union and its officials. Before hanging up, the Hungarian praised the new Gazprom headquarters he’d visited in Russia. “I am always at your disposal,” he added.

Seven months later, Ismailova was removed from the EU sanctions list.

This call between the two foreign ministers was one of several that took place between 2023 and 2025. Audio recordings of Szijjártó’s conversations with Lavrov, as well as other Russian officials, were obtained by reporters from VSquare, FRONTSTORY, Delfi Estonia, The Insider, and the Investigative Center of Ján Kuciak (ICJK). Reporters confirmed the content independently with intelligence sources in multiple countries and consulted on the authenticity of the audio with external experts.

The calls highlight the exceeding comity between Szijjártó, who represents an EU and NATO member, and Lavrov, who represents a nation that has invaded a European country and sponsored acts of arson and sabotage against NATO’s eastern flank. 

The two men’s conversations traffic in sensitive information about the internal deliberations of both Budapest and Brussels, which are doubtless of interest to the Kremlin. They also provide clearcut evidence of Russia’s role in prodding Hungary and Slovakia to soften EU sanctions against Russian individuals and entities.

In his exchanges with Lavrov, Szijjártó comes across as deferential, at times bordering on obsequious. “If you remove names and show these conversations to any case officer, he will swear that this is a transcript of an intelligence officer working his asset,” said a senior European intelligence officer after reviewing the transcripts.

Neither Lavrov nor Szijjártó replied to requests for comment. Usmanov’s German lawyer, Joachim Nikolaus Steinhöfel, declined to answer questions about the discussion between Lavrov and Szijjártó. He described EU sanctions against Usmanov and his relatives as “unjustified,” stressed his success as a businessman and philanthropist, and emphasized that Usmanov had won “over twenty court cases” against “media outlets, public figures, and politicians who disseminated various false statements about him … many of [which] echoed the very reasonings used for the EU sanctions.”

Szijjártó’s communications go far beyond Usmanov and his relatives. In a call with another Russian official, Deputy Energy Minister Pavel Sorokin, in the summer of 2025, Szijjártó not only says he has already diluted the EU’s 18th sanctions package, then under negotiation — he asks for additional talking points that would make his efforts appear to be in the interest of Hungary rather than Russia.

“I have already removed 72 [entities] from the list, but there were 128. I’m trying to continue, but I have to say that this is in the interest of Hungary,” Szijjártó says.

“If they [Sorokin’s staff] can help me identify the direct and negative effects on Hungary, I would be very grateful,” he adds, “because if I can show something like that, you would give me a completely different opportunity.”

Szijjártó’s willingness to act in Russia’s interests at the EU level helps explain why Moscow is investing significant effort in keeping Viktor Orbán and his pro-Kremlin Fidesz party in power in Hungary.

Independent polling suggests Orbán is trailing badly ahead of the April 12 parliamentary election, with the center-right Tisza party, led by challenger Péter Magyar, holding a strong lead.

As Orbán’s campaign struggles, Russia is reportedly stepping in to assist. As VSquare reported earlier this month, the Kremlin has assigned Sergey Kiriyenko — a deputy chief of staff to Putin and a key architect of Russia’s political influence operations — to covertly support Orbán’s campaign. Kiriyenko previously played an integral role in shaping election interference activities in Moldova.

At the same time, Orbán’s campaign has increasingly echoed Kremlin narratives, staging provocations against Ukraine and accusing opposition figures and critics of acting as Ukrainian proxies or spies while dismissing allegations of Orbán’s own ties to Russia.

The calls show that Szijjártó routinely kept Lavrov informed of supposedly confidential discussions by European diplomats.

For instance, in the same August 30, 2024 call with Lavrov, Szijjártó revealed details of a EU Foreign Affairs Council meeting that he had participated in the day before.

“That was crazy, you know, when [Lithuanian foreign minister Gabrielius] Landsbergis said that we contribute 12 percent of each rockets and missiles,” Szijjártó told Lavrov, referring to the minister’s argument that Hungarian and Slovak gas and oil payments were helping finance Russia’s war on Ukraine.

“I said, my friend, you are not right, because the Europeans contribute much more … it’s not only the Slovaks and us who are buying gas and oil from Russia directly but all of you who are buying the same from them through … India, Kazakhstan.” 

When reached for comment, Landsbergis confirmed that this conversation had taken place.

“It seems that all this time Putin had, and still has, a mole in all European and NATO official meetings,” he said. “If the integrity of these meetings is to be maintained, it would be appropriate to ban Hungary from all of them.”

“Every generation has a Kim Philby,” Landsbergis said, referring to the notorious KGB spy in the British Secret Intelligence Service. “Apparently Péter Szijjártó is playing the role with enthusiasm.”

Hungary’s Leverage

While the EU has sanctioned some 2,700 Russian citizens and entities due to their role in enabling Russia’s war on Ukraine, the bloc must vote every six months on whether to extend those sanctions. 

These decisions are made by consensus, meaning all 27 member states must agree. 

RFE/RL reported in March 2025 that Hungary and Slovakia threatened to block the extension of EU sanctions that month unless certain names were removed. It wasn’t just Ismailova: Russian businessman Viatcheslav Moshe Kantor and the country’s sports minister, Mikhail Degtyaryov, were also unsanctioned during that round.

Speaking on condition of anonymity in order to be able to reveal inside details, a European diplomat closely involved in the negotiations said that Hungary and Slovakia usually begin with a lengthy list of Russian names they want delisted. 

“They don’t use legal arguments,” the diplomat explained. “They just say they don’t want those people on the sanctions list for political reasons.”

As negotiations progress, Budapest and Bratislava usually whittle their list down to a handful of people, as was the case with Ismailova, Kantor, and Degtyaryov.

While it had long been suspected that Hungary and Slovakia leak the details of these negotiations to Moscow, the diplomat described newly obtained hard evidence as valuable: “Hungary is clearly fulfilling political orders from Russia,” they said when reporters showed them the transcripts.

‘No clear Hungarian interest’

Economic relief for individuals isn’t the only case in which Hungary secretly acted on the Kremlin’s behalf in Brussels.

In conversations with another high-ranking Russian official, Deputy Energy Minister Pavel Sorokin, Szijjártó said that he was doing his best to “repeal” a crucial EU sanctions package targeting Russia’s shadow fleet of oil tankers — the means by which Moscow evades Western energy sanctions.

In one conversation with Sorokin, Szijjártó offered to remove Russian banks proposed for designation by the EU. He even asked the Russian to provide him with arguments as to why doing so would be in Hungary’s interest.

In another call, Szijjártó complained that the EU refused to share with him documents related to the proposed sanctioning of 2Rivers, a Dubai-based company trading in Russian oil.

“They say that there is no clear Hungarian interest that they can identify, and therefore Hungary cannot legally ask them to be removed from the list,” Szijjártó said after Sorokin asked why Budapest had been cut out of the loop.

According to the EU, 2Rivers, formerly known as Coral Energy, has been a key player in selling Russian oil via its own shadow fleet of tankers and concealing the origin of crude from Russian state energy giant Rosneft, now under U.S. sanctions. 2Rivers then sells the crude above the internationally capped oil price and feeds Russia’s war machine with vital revenue. In December 2024, the UK sanctioned 2Rivers and its oil trading network.

It is unclear what interest Hungary — a landlocked country that receives oil through pipelines — could have in trying to preserve Russia’s shadow fleet operations. But the benefit to Russia is obvious.

After reporting that he was unsuccessful with 2Rivers, Szijjártó shared details with Sorokin about then-ongoing negotiations on the EU’s 18th sanctions package.

He explained that the vote was not yet on the agenda thanks to a postponement arranged by Hungary and Slovakia until the EU agreed to “make an exception” for those countries to “allow us to continue buying Russian gas and oil.”

The 18th sanctions package was proposed by the European Commission on June 10, 2025. Two weeks later, Szijjártó announced publicly that Hungary and Slovakia were blocking it “in response to European Union plans to phase out Russian energy imports.”

It was in a call with Sorokin a week later that Szijjártó asked for talking points about “negative effects on Hungary” to help him dilute the package.

Kinga Redłowska, a leading sanctions expert and the Head of CFS Europe at the London-based think tank RUSI, said Hungary’s approach serves a dual purpose.

“Domestically, it allows Viktor Orbán to reinforce an anti-Ukrainian narrative,” she said. “At the EU level, it provides leverage to extract concessions in unrelated areas, such as EU funding or rule-of-law disputes.”

But while this strategy may help Orbán’s government, enabling an aggressive neighbor to capture and hold more sovereign European land runs counter to Hungary’s national interest, she said: “Weakening sanctions risks bolstering Russia’s war economy, undermining the broader security interests of all EU member states, including Hungary itself.”

The conversations between Szijjártó and Sorokin also touched on Russian banks that were in the EU’s crosshairs.

“[S]hare the names of those banks with me, I can check if they are on the list or not, I’ll check the legal grounds and then I’ll do my best,” Szijjártó told Sorokin. “I know they want to put Sankt Petersburg Bank on the list, which I managed to remove; they also wanted to put another bank related to the Paks [nuclear power plant] project on the list, and I managed to remove it.”

After weeks of delays by Hungary and Slovakia, the European Union finally adopted the 18th sanctions package on July 18, 2025. 2Rivers was included on the list, prompting it to begin dissolving. The package also dealt a significant blow to Russia’s shadow fleet and its efforts to circumvent oil sanctions.

However, it remains unclear how much greater the impact might have been without Szijjártó’s efforts. By that time, his close relationship with Russia had already been made public.

In April 2025, the Polish weekly Polityka reported that Szijjártó was suspected of sharing written notes from EU ministerial meetings with Russia. Earlier this year, the Washington Post reported that Szijjártó has been regularly sharing information over the phone with Lavrov during breaks in EU talks. “Every single EU meeting for years has basically had Moscow behind the table,” a European security official told the Post.

Politico reported earlier this month that “the EU is limiting the flow of confidential material to Hungary and leaders are meeting in smaller groups.”

Hungary’s government dismissed such reports as “pro-Ukrainian propaganda,” while Szijjártó, while acknowledigng his frequent communication with Lavrov, called stories about his actions “fake news.”

This strategy appears to be backfiring. Szijjártó was recently booed by protesters, who shouted “traitor” and “Russian spy” at a campaign event.

Hungary’s interference in EU sanctions policy began within months of Russia’s full-scale invasion, hardening over the ensuing four years into a systematic lobbying effort for Kremlin-linked figures that was joined by Slovakia.

In June 2022, Hungary held up the entire sixth EU sanctions package — which included the landmark partial Russian oil embargo — until Patriarch Kirill, a former KGB agent and the head of the Russian Orthodox Church, was stripped from the list. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán personally intervened on the grounds of “religious freedom.”

In February 2025, Hungary extracted another Kirill exemption during negotiations on the 16th package, as well as saving the Russian Olympic Committee and two Russian football clubs.

In February 2026, Hungary vetoed the entire 20th sanctions package outright — the first time Budapest had gone that far — blocking new restrictive measures that had been intended to mark the fourth anniversary of the invasion, citing a dispute over oil flows through the Druzhba pipeline.

In March 2026, Slovakia threatened to veto the six-month renewal of the entire existing individual sanctions list unless Usmanov and another Russian oligarch, Mikhail Fridman, were immediately removed, before executing what EU diplomats called one of the strangest U-turns they had witnessed, backing down without securing either removal; Hungary likewise dropped its list of seven targets.

Nepal’s Supreme Court on Monday declined to release former Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli and former Home Minister Ramesh Lekhak following two separate petitions alleging their detention was illegal.

The petitions were filed Sunday, claiming that the arrests were unlawful after police took the former ministers into custody from their homes on Saturday morning. They face criminal negligence charges related to the deadly crackdown on last year’s Gen Z protests.

Authorities said the arrests were carried out under emergency warrants issued by the government. 

Supreme Court spokesperson Arjun Prasad Koirala told OCCRP that the court has ordered the government to submit a written response “explaining the circumstances and reasons for issuing an emergency arrest warrant within three days.” 

Oli served as prime minister four times and is chair of the Communist Party of Nepal—Unified Marxist–Leninist (UML). Despite his government’s collapse following mass protests, he was elected in December to a third term as the party’s chair.

Hundreds of members of Oli’s party, along with its sister organizations and student wings, have staged regular protests in Kathmandu’s Maitighar-Babarmahal area following the arrests.

On Sunday, the Kathmandu District Court remanded Oli and Lekhak to judicial custody for five days. Meanwhile, the party’s district committees submitted memoranda to the government demanding their immediate release.

“What we have done so far is to implement various reports. Everything is in accordance with the law,” government spokesperson Sasmita Pokhrel told journalists after the cabinet meeting on Monday.

Last week, a high-level commission investigating the violent suppression of 2025’s Gen Z uprising recommended criminal prosecution against the former prime minister and top security officials. 

Lekhak remains in police detention, while Oli has been admitted to the hospital due to heart issues. 

The former prime minister also faces separate legal troubles regarding a corruption probe. Nepal’s Department of Money Laundering Investigation has launched an inquiry into three former prime ministers and two former ministers for alleged money laundering offenses.

“We have received some complaints against former prime ministers and are in the preliminary phase of inquiry,” Jitendra Adhikari, a director at the Department of Money Laundering Investigation, told OCCRP. 

In addition to Oli, those under investigation include former prime ministers Sher Bahadur Deuba and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, as well as former ministers Arzu Rana Deuba and Deepak Khadka, the local newspaper Kathmandu Post reported. Nepali Police arrested Congress leader and former Energy Minister Deepak Khadka on Sunday.

“There are complaints concerning former prime ministers, and inquiries are ongoing. The Central Investigation Bureau (CIB)  is providing operational and investigative support to the DMLI as required,” CIB chief Manoj Kumar K.C. told OCCRP.

The wave of arrests follows Friday’s inauguration of Balendra “Balen” Shah, a 35-year-old rapper, as Nepal’s new prime minister. The Shah administration has unveiled an ambitious 100-point work plan for effective governance.

According to the plan, a high-level Asset Investigation Committee will be established under the Office of the Prime Minister and Council of Ministers within 15 days. In its first phase, the committee will collect, verify, and investigate the asset details of major political figures and high-ranking officials who have held public office over the last 20 years.

Balendra Shah’s Rastriya Swotantra Party won a landslide victory in March over four-time Prime Minister Oli, months after anti-corruption protests toppled the previous government.

Nigerian authorities have seized extensive assets held by a former education ministry official and his close family members who are on trial in two separate corruption cases. But real estate records show the family still controls two properties in the U.S. that have not been seized.

Prosecutors allege that Dibu Ojerinde, 78, diverted at least $13.7 million from the education ministry’s National Examination Council, as well as the Joint Admission and Matriculation Board. He held positions in those bodies for almost two decades.

Included in the 2019 lost assets seized from Ojerinde and his family are a petrol station, schools, hotels, upscale properties in the nation’s capital Abuja, and shares in various companies.  

However, property records obtained by Platform to Protect Whistleblowers in Africa (PPLAAF), Premium Times and OCCRP show two additional properties in Florida. The houses — valued at around $1.2 million combined — were not listed among the assets Nigerian authorities are seeking to confiscate in the case.

Ojerinde is facing an 18 count-charge of alleged diversion of public funds, abuse of office, and fraud-related offences, according to a 2021 indictment. 

A separate 2023 indictment includes three of his children and his daughter-in-law, as well as six companies as defendants. 

Trials for both cases are ongoing. 

Ojerinde’s sons, Adedayo, Olumide and Oluwaseun, are charged with criminal conspiracy to deal with or conceal property that was the subject of a corruption offence. 

Ojerinde’s daughter-in-law, Mary Funmilola Ojerinde, is facing two charges of concealing or managing property obtained through corrupt practices. Prosecutors allege she has taken control of corporate management and bank accounts that Ojerinde had owned and operated with false names.

Ojerinde did not respond to detailed questions submitted to his lawyer. His sons and his daughter-in-law did not reply to multiple requests for comment sent to email addresses listed as contacts in company filing in Nigeria.

Two of Ojerinde’s sons, as well as his daughter-in-law, purchased the U.S. properties that didn’t make it onto the list of assets to be seized.

Nigeria’s Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) alleges that Ojerinde owned and managed companies and bank accounts using false identities. He allegedly used these identities to conceal his illicit financial activities while he was heading the two education bodies.

According to the 2023 indictment obtained by the reporters, Ojerinde allegedly “took measures to conceal his ownership and active participation in the management of some of these companies and assets acquired for his corrupt benefit, by using forged documents, stolen identities and synthetic names.”

The ICPC also alleges that Ojerinde transferred “administration and management of the two companies, as well as their bank accounts” to his daughter-in-law, Mary after Nigeria introduced an anti–money laundering measure requiring a unique biometric identifier for all bank account holders.

Less than a month later, in April 2015, Mary and her husband, Olumide, purchased their first property for $380,000 in Miramar, Florida.

A second property was purchased in June 2017 in Miami by Olumide and another son, Oluwaseun, for $300,000. 

The investments have since proven profitable, as the value of the two homes increased considerably since the purchases.

In 2019, Ojerinde’s sons and daughter-in-law made moves to transfer ownership of the two properties into trusts, which are legal arrangements that are commonly used to shield the ultimate beneficiaries from public disclosure.

The Miramar house was transferred to an entity called Lenciaga Land Trust, while the Miami property was meant to be placed under the control of Venchy Land Trust.

However, the transfer of the Miami house did not succeed. Property registry documents obtained through a Freedom of Information request show that Miami-Dade County said it was unable to complete the title transfer, because the identity of the trustee responsible for managing the trust had not been specified.

Public records show no further filings for four years. Then, in April 2023, almost a month after the sons and daughter-in-law were indicted, their U.S. agent asked the county for assistance in correcting the filing. 

However, according to public records, the Miami property still officially remains in the names of the two sons.

One of the frontrunners to become Solomon Islands’ top police officer is under investigation for allegedly mishandling drug evidence in a case that has prompted whistleblower complaints, and caused ructions among the rank-and-file. 

An internal memo obtained by OCCRP’s member center, In-depth Solomons, reveals that prosecutors last year recommended suspending and criminally charging Ian Vaevaso, deputy commissioner of the Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF).

The recommendation followed an investigation alleging that Vaevaso improperly destroyed key drug evidence, intimidated officers who opposed him, and lied to investigators when confronted. 

In June 2025, the country’s top prosecutor issued a report recommending that Vaevaso be interviewed before the formal filing of charges. 

He has neither been suspended nor charged. The case has been stalled by a standoff between the prosecutor and a police commission tasked with oversight. 

Vaevaso continues to be a leading candidate to become commissioner, overseeing the police department’s 3,000 officers. 

Vaevaso declined to answer specific questions regarding the allegations sent by In-depth Solomons but confirmed there is an active inquiry. 

“It would be inappropriate and potentially prejudicial for me to comment publicly while such processes remain active and before any formal findings or decisions have been concluded,” Vaevaso said. 

“I wish to assure the public that I continue to cooperate fully with all lawful inquiries and respect the role of independent institutions tasked with examining these matters.”

In an interview, Director of Public Prosecutions Andrew Kelesi confirmed the authenticity of the memo, which was prepared by one of his senior legal officers. 

The memo, from mid 2025, said that there was “sufficient evidence to establish the criminal offence of abuse of office.” It recommended that Vaevaso and two other officers be suspended pending criminal investigation, and that “we file the appropriate criminal charges against the officers before the end of the month of June 2025.”

Kelesi said he had followed the memo’s advice and recommended that Vaevaso and the other officers be suspended, but that the police chief at the time and a commission overseeing police and correctional officers had failed to respond to his request. 

“We provided legal advice on the criminal aspects of this matter and recommended the suspension of the three concerned officers, as there is sufficient evidence based on exhibits and witness testimony,” he said in an interview. 

“However, the decision to suspend lies entirely with the RSIPF and the Police and Prison Services Commission (PPSC).”

Kelesi said that the memo was not a final decision and that he wanted to hear Vaevaso’s side of the story before deciding whether to charge him. He asked for the PPSC to interview Vaevaso, but that request was also ignored.

“My request is a thing that should have been done in just a week,” Kelesi said. “Now it’s almost a year [later] with nothing coming forth.”

“This is simply unfair for the public.”

David Suinara, the PPSC’s deputy secretary, denied responsibility, arguing that only the police chief can suspend an officer and that the request to interview Vaevaso should have come from the police.

But Kelesi said he had the authority to make the request, which was done with the agreement of the police chief and internal investigators to avoid conflicts of interest. Moreover, the PPSC remains in possession of the investigative files required to suspend Vaevaso, he said.

Mostyn Mangau, who was police chief at the time, said he was aware of the case but effectively cut out of the process.

“The file is with the PPSC, and never reached my office,” he said. “That’s the only reason I never acted on the case. Just because I am no longer there doesn’t mean they can put a blame on me.”

The impasse means that Vaevaso could soon take charge of the department. On March 22, Prime Minister Jeremiah Manele said the next police chief had been chosen, and would soon be announced.

Dumping Drugs

The case comes amid a surge of drug trafficking across the Pacific. 

Small island states have become midway points for narcotics bound for the wealthier shores of New Zealand and Australia. The influx of cheap methamphetamine is also driving an increase in local addiction in some Pacific island countries. 

In the Solomon Islands, three so-called “narco subs” were discovered in the past two years.

The case that has entangled the frontrunner for the country’s top police position began in October and November 2023, when a pair of drug busts resulted in the seizure of unspecified amounts of ketamine and methamphetamine.

A few months later, in February 2024, police issued a press release with photos of the drugs apparently being dumped into the ocean. 

The disposal of the drugs “generated significant concern within the RSIPF, with numerous officers questioning the legality and appropriateness of DC Vaevaso’s process,” according to a leaked report later written by Director of Public Prosecutions Kelesi. 

That report was separate from the memo obtained by reporters, and was emailed to a handful of people, including In-depth Solomons. 

Whistleblower Complaint

In August 2024, a whistleblower filed a complaint about Vaevaso with the Solomon Islands Independent Commission Against Corruption, which kicked off the probe into his actions

The commission referred the complaint to RSIPF’s Professional Standards and Internal Investigations Department for investigation, according to the public prosecutions report. Kelesi’s office was then tasked with offering legal advice. 

Then, this February, an anonymous person claiming to represent RSIPF rank-and-file officers emailed leading members of parliament and the police to demand action in the case. Attached to the email — sent to In-depth Solomons and some anti-corruption organizations — was a partially redacted copy of the public prosecutions report that raised concerns about Vaevaso’s “process” of destroying drugs.

Among those who received the email was acting police commissioner Mathias Lenialu, who had only been sworn in a few weeks earlier. He responded directly to the email, calling the allegation “a one-sided story of the issue.” 

“To our esteemed National Political Leaders and those copied in this email,” he wrote, “the RSIPF stands with DC Vaevaso and disassociate[s] itself from one or two police officers who are working hard to destroy the good reputation of DC Vaevaso with hidden interests and agendas.”

When questioned by In-depth Solomons, however, Lenialu said he wasn’t familiar with the case, couldn’t comment and referred questions to the Police and Prison Services Commission.

The public prosecutions report, which was submitted to the PPSC and police internal investigators on June 27, 2025, cites eight witnesses and six exhibits. 

It alleged that Vaevaso had bypassed proper channels and broken protocol by insisting subordinates hand the drugs over to him. When some officers raised concerns, Vaevaso allegedly “responded with hostility” and “may have used words which threatened” one with disciplinary inaction for her resistance. 

“This persistent acquisition of complete control over exhibits through multiple stages, conducted outside proper forensic oversight, demonstrates highly irregular and suspicious behavior,” the report continued. 

Vaevaso then allegedly stored the drugs in his private office for nearly a month, which created “ample opportunity for interference, mishandling, or tampering with critical evidence,” according to the report.

The deputy commissioner personally oversaw the destruction of the drugs at sea in an allegedly “intentional, premeditated, and clandestine nature.” 

The report concluded with the recommendation that Vaevaso be interviewed in anticipation of a formal criminal investigation. It did not go as far, however, as the earlier internal public prosecutions memo, which recommended that Vaevaso and two other officers be suspended and criminally charged.

Vaevaso declined to comment on the allegations citing, in part, his potential promotion. 

“At this time, I am unable to provide substantive comment on the matters raised,” he said. “As you may be aware, I am currently a candidate for the position of Commissioner of Police.”

NOTE: OCCRP’s Pacific Editor Dan McGarry passed away during the reporting of this article. He is greatly missed.