Author: tio

Jeffrey Epstein bought Venezuelan oil bonds issued by the hardline socialist state’s national oil company, according to newly-released documents. He was advised in the purchases by Francisco D’Agostino, a businessman currently wanted in Venezuela on charges of money laundering and criminal association.

Emails included in the files released by the U.S. Department of Justice show that D’Agostino visited the Caribbean island owned by Epstein, which is at the center of sex trafficking allegations against him.

In correspondence between the two men, D’Agostino advises Epstein in his purchase of bonds issued by Venezuela’s state-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela SA (PDVSA).

After talking business with D’Agostino, who holds both Venezuelan and Spanish citizenship, Epstein bought at least $4.5 million in oil bonds beginning in 2012. The bonds were set to mature in 2015 — during the period when Venezuela’s oil revenues collapsed, as corruption at PDVSA increased and production plummeted.

D’Agostino did not respond to requests for comment, which were sent by email and via his assistant by phone. OCCRP also emailed a lawyer who represented D’Agostino in Italy, but did not receive a response.

OCCRP was unable to obtain comment from PDVSA before publication.

‘I had so much fun’

D’Agostino’s relationship with Epstein appears to have begun not in a financial institution or boardroom. Instead, emails refer to their meeting during a visit by D’Agostino to Epstein’s private island in the U.S. Virgin Islands, Little Saint James — which was sometimes referred to as “Little Saint Jeff’s.”

“I had so much fun in Little St Jeffery…and Jane, the water gazelle is really stunning…what a beautiful and smart girl,” D’Agostino wrote to Epstein in October 2012.

“I enjoyed very much talking to you and would love to continue=to explore the different possibilities to make some money together,” D’Agostino added in the email. “I see the beginning of fun longlasting friendship.”

In October 2012, D’Agostino proposed a series of meetings in Caracas, which suggests he enjoyed a high level of access to Venezuela’s political and economic elite.

Among those he proposed introducing Epstein to was Baldo Sansó, a financial adviser to PDVSA and brother-in-law of Rafael Ramírez, then president of the state oil company. OCCRP sent questions to an email address in Sansó’s name, but did not receive a response.

Epstein appears to have chosen to wait for the outcome of the October 2012 presidential election before making any plans to travel to Venezuela. When D’Agostino informed him that populist President Hugo Chávez had won his fourth term by approximately 10 percent, Epstein replied succinctly: “Great.” 

An email from December 2012 shows D’Agostino keeping Epstein up to date about Chávez, who had been diagnosed with cancer and was rumored to be close to death.

“It seems very acccurate that Chavez has about 6 months left or less,” D’Agostino wrote, adding that Venezuela’s constitution would require elections within 30 days of a president dying. 

“I think there is a very high probability that someone from the Chavez movement, but less radical will win the elections,” he predicted.

As political uncertainty pervaded in Venezuela, emails in January 2013 show Epstein offering to host D’Agostino again on his private island, telling him to “visit when you like.”

D’Agostino responded: “By the way…how is my water gaselle???” Epstein replied that she was “here and naked.”

Chávez died on March 5, 2013. His loyalist, Nicolás Maduro, won elections the following month. It is unclear whether Epstein ever made the planned visit to Caracas.

Increased Exposure

Over the two years following that exchange of emails, Epstein increased his exposure to Venezuela’s oil sector, placing direct orders for additional purchases of PDVSA bonds. 

Meanwhile, the industry suffered a steep descent.

Venezuela’s oil revenues fell by 40 percent over 2014 and 2015, reportedly due to low prices. As the years wore on, PDVSA would be severely undermined by corruption, decimating Venezuela’s oil industry. The U.S. imposed sanctions on the entire oil sector in 2019.

That same year, Epstein was arrested on U.S. federal sex trafficking charges and later found hanged in his New York City jail cell, in a death ruled a suicide. American prosecutors were preparing to try him for allegedly abusing dozens of underage girls at his homes and elsewhere. He had pleaded not guilty.

D’Agostino himself came under scrutiny in the years after making contact with Epstein, and following his death.

One of the influential people he suggested introducing Epstein to was his alleged business associate Alejandro Betancourt López, a co-founder of Derwick Associates.

Derwick received contracts to build power plants directly from Venezuelan state companies without going through a competitive bidding process, OCCRP has reported. The company then overcharged the government by $2.9 billion, according to the Venezuelan chapter of the anti-corruption group Transparency International. 

Betancourt did not respond to a request for comment, but told OCCRP in 2021 that he was innocent of the corruption allegations against him.

On November 6, 2012, D’Agostino wrote to Epstein: “Alejandro Betancourt, my business partner, and I are available to meet you Monday November 19th. Shall we have lunch? Your place?”

Multiple lawsuits alleged that D’Agostino was a key figure in Derwick’s operations. These included a 2013 civil suit by a Washington lobbyist and former U.S. ambassador to Venezuela, Otto Reich, which accused him and several executives of bribery and racketeering linked to the energy contracts. That case was dismissed in a U.S. court for lack of jurisdiction. 

D’Agostino has consistently denied holding a position at Derwick, and has not been charged or convicted in the alleged fraud. In 2024, Spain’s National Court reportedly opened an investigation into former executives of Derwick — including D’Agostino — over that alleged financial fraud, which involved Spanish companies.

D’Agostino was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury in 2021 for “ties to a network attempting to evade United States sanctions on Venezuela’s oil sector.” Treasury removed him from its sanctions list last year.

Last month, D’Agostino was reportedly arrested on an international warrant from Venezuela, where he has been charged with money laundering and criminal association. 

D’Agostino was detained while attempting to cross the border from Italy to France. He was released after Italian judges ruled he would be at risk of suffering inhumane or degrading treatment if imprisoned in Venezuela.

In a surprising move, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov dismissed his once-close ally Kamchybek Tashiev from his posts as head of the State Committee for National Security (GKNB) and deputy head of the Cabinet of Ministers, the Presidential Administration announced Tuesday.

The administration said three of Tashiev’s deputies were also dismissed.

Japarov’s press secretary said the President acted “in the interest of the state,” and to “prevent a split in society, including between government structures, but on the contrary, to strengthen unity,” according to Kaktus news outlet.

Tashiev has not commented on his dismissal.

He was appointed GKNB head in October 2020, shortly after Japarov was released from prison following the uprising. Since then, Kyrgyzstan’s security service has become one of the country’s most powerful state institutions, overseeing numerous arrests of journalists and activists.

The dismissal was unexpected. In a recent documentary about Japarov, Tashiev said, “only death can separate him from his friendship with Sadyr Japarov,,” adding that their shared goals and paths were unbreakable despite efforts by others to divide them.

Their alliance dates back to the 2010s and was shaped by joint opposition activities in parliament. In 2012, they were detained while trying to climb the White House fence during a rally calling for the nationalization of Kyrgyzstan’s Kumtor gold deposit.

Japarov was later freed from prison on the night of October 5-6, 2020, by supporters including Tashiev, amid protests following parliamentary elections.

The European Union is considering sanctions on a Georgian port accused of handling Russian oil, as part of a new package of measures against Moscow, RFE/RL reported on Monday.

The outlet cited a European Commission proposal outlining measures against the port of Kulevi in Georgia, alongside other facilities in Russia and Indonesia. 

EU member states have not yet approved the proposal, which would form part ofhe bloc’s 20th package of sanctions against Russia since Moscow’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. If adopted, the measures would bar EU companies and individuals from conducting business with these ports. 

According to RFE/RL, the proposal alleges that Kulevi has received Russian oil imports via “vessels that employ irregular and high-risk shipping practices.” The draft package also includes sanctions targeting ships linked to Russia’s so-called “shadow fleet.” 

Vakhtang Partsvania, a professor at the Caucasus University in Tbilisi, told OCCRP’s Georgian member center Monitori that the proposed sanctions would “touch the entire logistics through this port.” Such a move, he added, would make Kulevi “unattractive to international shipping and isolated from the global financial and insurance system.”

Kulevi oil terminal has long been operated by the State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic (SOCAR). In a response to Monitori, Tamar Javakhishvili, SOCAR Energy Georgia’s Deputy General Director for Marketing and Communications said that the terminal’s operations would be restricted in the event of sanctions. 

“The terminal [Kulevi] is owned by SOCAR, while it has independent management. In reality, this matter needs to be clarified with the state authorities,” she added. According to the company’s official website, the terminal is operated by SOCAR’s another subsidiary, Black Sea Terminal LLC. 

Responding to RFE/RL’s reporting, Georgian Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze said the government was “ready to present detailed information to the European Commission” regarding the proposed sanctions: “Of course, we do not believe that anything is happening [at Kulevi] that contradicts sanctions policy,” he added.

Shipments of Russian crude oil to the Kulevi oil terminal began at the end of 2025. Upon arrival, the oil was transferred to the new Kulevi refinery, operated by the Georgian firm Black Sea Petroleum.

Officially, Black Sea Petroleum belongs to Georgian designer and former model Maka Asatiani and Davit Potskhveria, the nephew of her husband Konstantine Gogelia, who is himself a member of the company’s supervisory board and Asatiani’s authorized representative. 

Last year, the investigative outlet Proekt revealed that Asatiani’s son from her first marriage is a business partner of the son of Vladimir Alekseyev, the first deputy chief of Russia’s GRU military intelligence.

The Chairman of the Supervisory Board at Black Sea Petroleum is the former Minister of Economy and former Vice Prime Minister, Levan Davitashvili. 

Reporters were unable to reach the company for comment. 

Corruption is surging worldwide, threatening public trust, enabling organized crime, and weakening democratic institutions, Transparency International warned Tuesday in its 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI). 

Experts say shrinking civic space and faltering accountability are fueling the problem, putting governance—and citizens—at risk.

Since its inception, Transparency International’s CPI has become the leading global indicator of the perception of public sector corruption. The index scores 182 countries and territories, using data from 13 external sources, including the World Bank, World Economic Forum, private risk and consulting companies, think tanks, and others. Scores range from zero to 100, with zero indicating very corrupt governance and 100 very clean.

Countries perceived as the least corrupt in 2025 include Denmark (89), Finland (88), Singapore (84), New Zealand (81), Norway (81), and Australia (76), setting the global benchmark for clean governance.

Eastern Europe and Central Asia are struggling with a decade of stalled reforms. The region scores just 34, with six countries significantly worsening and only seven improving. Weak institutions, concentration of power, and undue influence on the judiciary are eroding public oversight. 

Across the Western Balkans, opaque investment decisions and secret deals have exposed public funds to corruption. In Serbia, the Prosecution for Organized Crime faces government pressure and smear campaigns, while in Bosnia and Herzegovina, political influence over judicial appointments continues to block reform.

Lidija Prokić, Regional Advisor for Eastern and South East Europe, pointed out that corruption thrives where democracy is weakened and accountability fails. Ukraine (36) and Moldova (42) stand out as rare examples of progress, where strong civil society and independent institutions have driven meaningful reforms.

Western Europe and the European Union have seen anti-corruption progress stall, with the regional average CPI dropping from 66 to 64 over the past decade. Key EU states, including the UK (70), France (66), and Spain (55), have experienced backsliding, while Hungary (40) and Slovakia (48) weaken safeguards against political influence and corruption investigations. 

Transparency International warns that weakened oversight and attacks on civil society are making abuses harder to detect.

Flora Cresswell, Regional Advisor for Western Europe, highlighted that Europe should raise its anti-corruption ambitions rather than lower them amid current geopolitical challenges.

The Americas continue to struggle, with a regional average of 42. Corruption has allowed organized crime to infiltrate politics in Colombia (37), Mexico (27), and Brazil (35), undermining security and human rights. Fragile states like Haiti (16) and Nicaragua (14) remain plagued by entrenched corruption. Even stronger democracies, including Costa Rica (56) and Uruguay (73), face growing threats from criminal networks.

Asia-Pacific averages 45, with widespread governance failures and limited accountability fueling public frustration. The Philippines (32) lost funds to a fake flood relief project, Indonesia (34) saw deadly anti-government protests, and Nepal (34) toppled its government amid social unrest linked to corruption. 

TI’s CPI claims that fragile states such as Afghanistan (16), Myanmar (16), and North Korea (15) remain at the bottom, where restricted civic space and opaque political systems leave corruption unchecked.

Such a situation, according to Ilham Mohamed, Asia Pacific Adviser, is fueling corruption across the region, with weak law enforcement, opaque political funding, and unaccountable leadership. She added that leaders must respond to growing public demand for stronger governance and democracy.

The Middle East and North Africa also remain vulnerable. Even the region’s highest scorers—United Arab Emirates (69), Qatar (58), and Saudi Arabia (57)—are dependent on leaders’ political will to implement reforms. Syria (15), Libya (13), and Yemen (13) remain entrenched in corruption amid conflict and institutional weakness, according to the report.

Sub-Saharan Africa scores lowest globally, averaging 32. Governments fail to protect public funds or deliver services effectively. Somalia (9) and South Sudan (9) are at the bottom, while Madagascar (25) recently saw a youth-led uprising against entrenched corruption. Angola has improved slightly but remains at the lower end of the index. Paul Banoba, TI’s regional advisor, noted that public sector corruption always hits the most vulnerable people the hardest.

French and Romanian authorities have arrested 13 people suspected of laundering at least 306 million euros ($364 million) in proceeds from drug trafficking and other crimes, Eurojust said.

The group is believed to have operated between 2018 and 2024 through a cross-border network spanning France and Romania. Eurojust said the suspects allegedly funneled large sums through accounts of companies under their control.

In Romania, part of the funds was invested in real estate, often registered in the names of third parties to conceal beneficial ownership. Authorities seized more than 400,000 euros in cash, along with jewelry, luxury watches and mobile phones.

Former President Mohamed Waheed of the Maldives pitched a private island investment worth $25 million to Jeffrey Epstein, according to newly released records from the U.S. Justice Department, adding to a growing body of material showing how Epstein cultivated ties with political and business figures around the world even after his 2008 conviction.

“You will have a small stunningly beautiful island with about 10 villas, each with three or four bedrooms,” Waheed wrote to Epstein referring to Fuggiri, a small island in the Maldives, on May 18, 2014, eight months after leaving office. The project would target “Middle Eastern royal families and our rich Russian clients,” he said. Waheed signed off: “Best regards to you and your beautiful students.”

Epstein expressed interest and asked about the budget, the records show, though there is no indication the deal moved forward. In 2015, the Maldivian government leased Fuggiri for resort development to a Dubai-based company, Classic Citi Island Holdings, without a competitive bidding process.

The island later became the subject of an investigation by the Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, which found that the company behind the lease was controlled by Indian businessmen Amit and Avinash Kumar Gandhi through a network of shell companies revealed in the Pandora Papers. Former President Abdulla Yameen, who succeeded Waheed, is currently on trial in the Maldives, accused of accepting a $1.1 million bribe in connection with the no-bid lease of Fuggiri. He has denied wrongdoing.

The newly released Epstein files also identify Waheed’s business partner on the proposed resort projects as Ibrahim Mohamed Didi, a prominent Maldivian developer. Didi acted as an intermediary with Sultan Ahmed bin Sulayem, the chief executive of the Dubai ports operator DP World, according to the documents. Bin Sulayem appears frequently in Epstein’s correspondence, and text messages show Waheed was in contact with both men during the same period. 

In one exchange from June 2012, Waheed told Epstein he was “meeting Sultan this evening on his boat,” to which Epstein replied, “I know sultan is there.” Records indicate bin Sulayem visited the Maldives in 2014 to discuss port investments with Yameen, who had succeeded Waheed in November 2013.

The correspondence between Waheed and Epstein began in September 2011, when Mr. Waheed was serving as vice president. After meeting Epstein during the United Nations General Assembly in New York, Mr. Waheed sent a message saying it was “refreshing to meet someone without any pretenses.” Epstein responded, “We will have fun.” Their exchanges continued until at least early 2016 and included dinners at Epstein’s Manhattan townhouse, holiday greetings and New Year’s messages.

Mr. Waheed resigned this month from his role as a presidential special envoy after the emails became public. In a statement, he said his interactions with Epstein were “strictly professional,” not social, and that he had been unaware of Epstein’s 2008 conviction at the time.

Mr. Waheed’s son, Jeffrey Salim Waheed, who attended a meeting with Epstein in 2014, said in a statement that the family learned of the full extent of Epstein’s crimes only years later. “Epstein was a monster,” he said. “But we only knew the depth of his depravity long after we stopped engaging with him.”

The documents do not suggest that the proposed island investment was completed or that Mr. Waheed was involved in any criminal activity. But they offer a detailed glimpse of how Epstein continued to position himself as a financier and dealmaker, drawing in former heads of state and well-connected intermediaries even as his past conduct was a matter of public record.