Author: tio

  • ACE Subpoena Targets French Private Tracker, Chinese Pirate Forum, and Vietnamese APIs

    ACE Subpoena Targets French Private Tracker, Chinese Pirate Forum, and Vietnamese APIs

    The Alliance for Creativity and Entertainment (ACE) established itself as the world’s leading anti-piracy coalition.

    The Motion Picture Association-led organization united rightsholders from all over the world, forming a united front against online copyright infringement.

    While much of the enforcement work takes place behind closed doors, DMCA subpoenas are a staple information-gathering tool of ACE. Through these subpoenas, the organization requests third-party intermediaries to hand over information they have on various alleged pirate sites.

    Earlier this year, ACE obtained a DMCA subpoena, compelling Discord to identify the operators of community servers attached to pirate streaming portals HDFull. This was paired with a broader subpoena, asking Cloudflare to share details on HDFull’s domain operator, as well as those of other sites.

    DMCA Subpoenas

    A few days ago, ACE requested a new DMCA subpoena against Cloudflare, targeting 29 new domain names. The legal paperwork is filed by the Motion Picture Association and names Columbia, Disney, Paramount, Universal, and Warner Bros., who are all ACE members too.

    Specifically, the subpoena demands identifying information, such as physical addresses, IP addresses, phone numbers, email addresses, payment information, and account history, related to the Cloudflare accounts associated with these sites.

    DOMAINS NAMED IN THE MPA’S MAY 15 SUBPOENA

    1lou.me, 5movierulz.codes, 5movierulz.holiday, 5movierulz.theater,
    kino.pub, kkk1.lat, kkphim.com, la-cale.space, motchillic.io,
    motchillk.mov, motchillkc.fm, motchills.now, motchillws.net,
    movidy.wiki, nanamovies.org, netcinevu.lat, ophim17.cc,
    phim.nguonc.com, rrrv.lol, series.ly, subserieshd.com,
    vegamovies.market, vegamovies.vodka, vvv1.lat, wizja.cc,
    wookafr.wales, wookafr.zip, xk4l.mzt4pr8wlkxnv0qsha5g.website,
    xprime.stream

    The list of domain names is a testament to the global nature of the anti-piracy coalition, targeting French, Chinese, Vietnamese, Russian, Spanish, and Hindi-language sites, among others.

    A Young French Torrent Tracker

    One of the targeted domain names is la-cale.space, a French private BitTorrent tracker that launched in late December 2025. The site stands out because it’s a relatively new invitation-only community whose reach is more limited than public torrent or streaming sites.

    Private Port, No Mercy for Informants

    The private tracker has grown quite significantly recently, particularly after the collapse of the French YggTorrent tracker. The subpoena will test how well the operators have shielded their identities.

    Domains, Works & URLs

    domain

    The subpoena request lists “Moana” and “Gladiator 2” as two titles that are shared on the site. The legal paperwork also lists the private URLs, suggesting that the anti-piracy group has access to the private community.

    A Veteran Chinese Torrent Forum

    ACE’s subpoena also targets another pirate community that is the opposite of the French tracker in many ways. The Chinese forum known as “BT Home / 1LOU Station”, currently operating from 1lou.me, is far from a newcomer.

    The veteran community has been operating in various incarnations for around two decades, hopping through domains including BTBTT, BTBBT, 1lou.icu, 1lou.pro, and now 1lou.me. It was one of the first torrent-oriented communities and remains online today, with millions of monthly visitors.

    BT Home

    bthome

    The long-running Chinese forum is also an unusual target, as it is predominantly popular in mainland China. As far as we know, ACE does not have any members there. That said, the Hollywood movie studios have commercial interests around the globe.

    Vietnamese APIs & Other International Targets

    The list of domain names also includes kkphim.com, ophim17.cc, and phim.nguonc.com, which are not typical pirate streaming sites. Kkphim.com openly markets itself as a developer API, supplying movie metadata, posters, and m3u8 stream links for use by third-party streaming sites.

    Technically, these sites can also be used directly by end users, but they are marketed as a “Piracy as a Service” platform, allowing others to easily launch their own pirate sites.

    The international nature of the subpoena targets doesn’t end in Vietnam. The legal paperwork also lists the Russian site Kino.pub, the Thai nanamovies.org, various domains of the Indian streaming portal Movierulz, the Polish wizja.cc, and several Brazilian streaming outlets, including rrrv.lol.

    To top it off, ACE also brings back a familiar target in the form of series.ly. The Spanish-language streaming portal has been around for over a decade, and its admins were acquitted twice over the past few years, in part because linking to copyrighted content wasn’t a crime in Spain when the alleged offenses took place.

    At the time of writing, the subpoena has yet to be signed by a court clerk, which is typically just a formality. After it’s signed, ACE will have to wait and see how accurate the information is that Cloudflare has on file.

    Operators of pirate sites are known to use false data with their hosting and infrastructure providers, which often limits the value of these subpoenas. That said, ACE had success with this enforcement tool in the past, and even minor leads can be useful when paired with information from other sources.

    A copy of the MPA’s §512(h) subpoena application is available here (pdf), along with the associated declaration (pdf) and the notice to Cloudflare (pdf).

    From: TF, for the latest news on copyright battles, piracy and more.

  • The Radical Non-Binary Preacher Left Out of the History of America’s Founding

    The Radical Non-Binary Preacher Left Out of the History of America’s Founding

    Jemima Wilkinson was born in Rhode Island, that colonial hotbed of difficult women, in 1752. In 1776, a year best remembered for other crises, Wilkinson took to her bed with a high fever, in a medical crisis so intense that her family nearly despaired of the vigorous young woman’s life. And in a way, they did lose Jemima. The figure that rose from the sweaty bedsheets when the fever broke was, by their own account, a reborn entity using the physical form of the recovering girl. Announcing a new, genderless identity as the Public Universal Friend, they began a career as a preacher, building on the Quakerism of their youth to evangelize a new denomination, the Society of Universal Friends, to the people of the fledgling United States. That ministry would last until the Friend’s death in 1819.

  • A Brief Tribute to New Orleans Music

    A Brief Tribute to New Orleans Music

    “There is a real mania in this city for horn and trumpet playing,” remarked the New Orleans Daily Picayune in 1838. “You can hardly turn a corner,” it lamented, without hearing brass players, quoting a local who said he “earnestly desired to hear the last trumpet.” We are coming upon 200 years later, and the situation hasn’t changed much. On my bike rides home through the French Quarter, I often get caught behind a second-line parade, usually for a wedding, the band belting out “L’il Liza Jane” or “Hey Baby.” Then there are the regular Sunday parades put on by the Social Aid and Pleasure clubs, with names like the Men & Lady Buckjumpers, the Uptown Swingers, the Dumaine Street Gang, the Pigeon Town Steppers, the Valley of Silent Men, and the Black Men of Labor. They snake through neighborhoods, with the brass bands blaring for hours at a stretch and the whole community coming out to dance.

  • CISA Admin Leaked AWS GovCloud Keys on Github

    CISA Admin Leaked AWS GovCloud Keys on Github

    Until this past weekend, a contractor for the Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) maintained a public GitHub repository that exposed credentials to several highly privileged AWS GovCloud accounts and a large number of internal CISA systems. Security experts said the public archive included files detailing how CISA builds, tests and deploys software internally, and that it represents one of the most egregious government data leaks in recent history.

    On May 15, KrebsOnSecurity heard from Guillaume Valadon, a researcher with the security firm GitGuardian. Valadon’s company constantly scans public code repositories at GitHub and elsewhere for exposed secrets, automatically alerting the offending accounts of any apparent sensitive data exposures. Valadon said he reached out because the owner in this case wasn’t responding and the information exposed was highly sensitive.

    A redacted screenshot of the now-defunct “Private CISA” repository maintained by a CISA contractor.

    The GitHub repository that Valadon flagged was named “Private-CISA,” and it harbored a vast number of internal CISA/DHS credentials and files, including cloud keys, tokens, plaintext passwords, logs and other sensitive CISA assets.

    Valadon said the exposed CISA credentials represent a textbook example of poor security hygiene, noting that the commit logs in the offending GitHub account show that the CISA administrator disabled the default setting in GitHub that blocks users from publishing SSH keys or other secrets in public code repositories.

    “Passwords stored in plain text in a csv, backups in git, explicit commands to disable GitHub secrets detection feature,” Valadon wrote in an email. “I honestly believed that it was all fake before analyzing the content deeper. This is indeed the worst leak that I’ve witnessed in my career. It is obviously an individual’s mistake, but I believe that it might reveal internal practices.”

    One of the exposed files, titled “importantAWStokens,” included the administrative credentials to three Amazon AWS GovCloud servers. Another file exposed in their public GitHub repository — “AWS-Workspace-Firefox-Passwords.csv” — listed plaintext usernames and passwords for dozens of internal CISA systems. According to Caturegli, those system included one called “LZ-DSO,” which appears short for “Landing Zone DevSecOps,” the agency’s secure code development environment.

    Philippe Caturegli, founder of the security consultancy Seralys, said he tested the AWS keys only to see whether they were still valid and to determine which internal systems the exposed accounts could access. Caturegli said the GitHub account that exposed the CISA secrets exhibits a pattern consistent with an individual operator using the repository as a working scratchpad or synchronization mechanism rather than a curated project repository.

    “The use of both a CISA-associated email address and a personal email address suggests the repository may have been used across differently configured environments,” Caturegli observed. “The available Git metadata alone does not prove which endpoint or device was used.”

    The Private CISA GitHub repo exposed dozens of plaintext credentials for important CISA GovCloud resources.

    Caturegli said he validated that the exposed credentials could authenticate to three AWS GovCloud accounts at a high privilege level. He said the archive also includes plain text credentials to CISA’s internal “artifactory” — essentially a repository of all the code packages they are using to build software — and that this would represent a juicy target for malicious attackers looking for ways to maintain a persistent foothold in CISA systems.

    “That would be a prime place to move laterally,” he said. “Backdoor in some software packages, and every time they build something new they deploy your backdoor left and right.”

    In response to questions, a spokesperson for CISA said the agency is aware of the reported exposure and is continuing to investigate the situation.

    “Currently, there is no indication that any sensitive data was compromised as a result of this incident,” the CISA spokesperson wrote. “While we hold our team members to the highest standards of integrity and operational awareness, we are working to ensure additional safeguards are implemented to prevent future occurrences.”

    A review of the GitHub account and its exposed passwords show the “Private CISA” repository was maintained by an employee of Nightwing, a government contractor based in Dulles, Va. Nightwing declined to comment, directing inquiries to CISA.

    CISA has not responded to questions about the potential duration of the data exposure, but Caturegli said the Private CISA repository was created on November 13, 2025. The contractor’s GitHub account was created back in September 2018.

    The GitHub account that included the Private CISA repo was taken offline shortly after both KrebsOnSecurity and Seralys notified CISA about the exposure. But Caturegli said the exposed AWS keys inexplicably continued to remain valid for another 48 hours.

    CISA is currently operating with only a fraction of its normal budget and staffing levels. The agency has lost nearly a third of its workforce since the beginning of the second Trump administration, which forced a series of early retirements, buyouts, and resignations across the agency’s various divisions.

    The now-defunct Private CISA repo showed the contractor also used easily-guessed passwords for a number of internal resources; for example, many of the credentials used a password consisting of each platform’s name followed by the current year. Caturegli said such practices would constitute a serious security threat for any organization even if those credentials were never exposed externally, noting that threat actors often use key credentials exposed on the internal network to expand their reach after establishing initial access to a targeted system.

    “What I suspect happened is [the CISA contractor] was using this GitHub to synchronize files between a work laptop and a home computer, because he has regularly committed to this repo since November 2025,” Caturegli said. “This would be an embarrassing leak for any company, but it’s even more so in this case because it’s CISA.”

  • We Updated Our Privacy Policy. Here’s What Changed and Why.

    We recently updated our privacy policy for the first time since 2022. Most of the changes are clarifications, reorganizations, and improvements in transparency, particularly around how third-party tools that run parts of our site operate. But one change is substantive enough that we want to address it directly.

    The Change You Should Know About: Opt-In Email Tracking

    We want to know how we’re doing with our advocacy: which campaigns get your attention and which do not, which topics you are very interested in, which less so, and which not at all. It helps us to do our work better and to prioritize or rethink our strategies as we push to build support for freedom, justice and innovation around the world.

    So, to give us a rough picture of how we’re doing, we are introducing the option for you to provide explicit, opt-in consent for us to see how you interact with the emails we send you. That includes whether you open emails, and whether you click on the links inside them.

    We know what you’re thinking: Doesn’t EFF strongly oppose nonconsensual tracking? You bet we do. Sneaky email tracking is ubiquitous on the web and EFF’s opposition to it remains unchanged. We have never used email tracking pixels and we’re not changing that. We’re not building profiles and we’re not sharing the data and we’re definitely not selling it.

    But we do want to give you the option of allowing us to learn about how our communications are landing with you. Here’s how consent will work. We will ask, and if you say yes, we’ll be able to see whether you opened an email or not, and whether you clicked on any links. That’s it.

    If you say no, or ignore the ask entirely, nothing will change and we’ll do no tracking.

    If you say yes, you can change your mind and opt out at any time by clicking an opt-out link in any future email or by contacting membership@eff.org.

    We have heard many EFF members say that EFF is one of the only organizations that they trust with consent to track their emails. That trust is important, and we do not take it lightly. But it led us to think that if we ask, enough of you would agree that we could have a better picture of how our campaigns and other emails to you are landing and that, in turn, could help us decide what to double down on and what to change.

    By giving you a real ability to consent, EFF is taking a very different path than most of the web. Asking isn’t the norm; it’s more or less never an option to say no and dark patterns often make it hard even if it looks like you can. Unfortunately, estimates have shown that 2/3s of emails received by users contain tracking, regardless of whether the senders received explicit consent at the time when a recipient signs up to receive their mailings. Automatic, nonconsensual tracking doesn’t have to be the default, and it shouldn’t be.

    We hope our approach works and it inspires others. It shouldn’t be an abnormality that users are not tracked by default, and that only users who feel comfortable doing so choose to consent to tracking. We hope that our example will show mailing platforms, organizations, and users that a privacy-protective approach is better and worth doing and can still give an email sender a solid understanding what campaigns and other messages resonate with recipients. We weighed this decision carefully. We know that email tracking is something we’ve criticized when used covertly or without meaningful consent and that many people don’t like at all. For EFF, an opt-in requirement isn’t a formality. It’s the key distinction between a sneaky strategy and an aboveboard relationship with you. And to us, it’s just a common sense approach based on respect.

    It’s also consistent with our advocacy and approach to technology. We have said for many years that strong consumer privacy laws must require real opt-in consent before data is collected. And we have walked our talk in other ways as well, including in pushing for Do Not Track policies and in Privacy Badger, which protects you from ads and trackers that violate the principle of user consent.

    Again, this behavior has been our suggestion for privacy policies, and privacy laws. In 2022 we released a guide for nonprofits that recommended the following:

    Not tracking email open rates can, unfortunately, sometimes cause list “hygiene” problems, because it becomes difficult to know whether email subscribers on your list are still interested. You can send occasional emails to ensure subscribers want to receive emails, either using open or click tracking, and informing people that the purpose of that specific email is to determine active subscribers. The essential point is to let users know when you are using tracking, and to do it in a limited way when possible….

    The Internet Archive found that while they preferred to use no open tracking in their emails to subscribers, too many unreachable email addresses had been added to their list over the years, and some email addresses had even become spam traps. To continue working with their email service provider, they needed to activate some tracking. They needed email open data to know whether an email address was still active or not; but they didn’t need or want gender, age, or demographic data. They settled on informing users that their email open rates are being tracked, and offering the alternate option to sign up for plain-text versions of their emails, which won’t transmit any data at all.

    In 2019, we recommended that all strong consumer privacy laws must include opt-in consent for data collection. We wrote:

    Right to opt-in consent

    New legislation should require the operators of online services to obtain opt-in consent to collect, use, or share personal data, particularly where that collection, use, or transfer is not necessary to provide the service.

    Any request for opt-in consent should be easy to understand and clearly advise the user what data the operator seeks to gather, how they will use it, how long they will keep it, and with whom they will share it. This opt-in consent should also be ongoing—that is, the request should be renewed any time the operator wishes to use or share data in a new way, or gather a new kind of data. And the user should be able to withdraw consent, including for particular purposes, at any time.

    Opt-in consent is better than opt-out consent. The default should be against collecting, using, and sharing personal information. Many consumers cannot or will not alter the defaults in the technologies they use, even if they prefer that companies do not collect their information.

    We are sticking to those recommendations, which unfortunately are not yet the law, and following our principles.

    We hope that you will feel comfortable opting in, but we also respect that you need to make that decision for yourself, and that you may need to change it as you go. We’ll do our part to make that as clear and easy as possible. And if you do agree, we’ll be grateful for getting a chance to learn a little more about how we’re doing, hopefully in ways that can make us even more effective at ensuring that technology supports freedom, justice and innovation for all the people of the world.

    Other Changes: Clarity and Stronger Protections

    The rest of the update is largely about being more precise and provide more transparency into our practices.

    Cookies on eff.org: The new policy tightens our cookie practices. Previously, we carved out exceptions for “remember me” and logged-in users; now we don’t use persistent ID cookies on the eff.org domain at all. We also clarified that other EFF-operated sites‚ like acteff.org and shopeff.org‚ have their own cookie policies and that our policies aren’t the ones that apply there. We’re not happy that you have to navigate multiple policies like this, but it’s one of the ways that the cookie ecosystem has gotten unfortunately complex. We want to be sure you know that and know where to look for all the information.

    Third-party tool transparency: Similarly, while the vast majority of EFF’s public-facing websites, online tools and tech projects are created internally, self-hosted, and self-maintained, some of them are not. In this new policy, we are working to be more detailed and explicit in the new policy about those third-party services, and how they operate under their own privacy policies, not solely ours.

    To help you understand exactly what choices you have when using these tools, we’re publishing dedicated Privacy Guides for each of them. The first is live now for our shop, which runs on Shopify: EFF Shopify Privacy Guide. Guides for our other third-party tools are coming soon. As always, we recommend installing Privacy Badger to limit exposure from third-party tracking.

    Overall, EFF believes that when a project like the Atlas of Surveillance doesn’t exist, and we think it should, we build it and maintain it. But what matters most to us is protecting your digital rights. So the time required to maintain and upgrade the tools we have built has to be weighed against our need to build new projects to fight new fights. And sometimes, a tool that was needed when we built it, like EFF’s Action Center, can be replaced by something that can take some of the weight off our internal staff.

    To help make space for new projects, we carefully investigate services we rely on—like our campaign tools, payment processors, and online shop—and look for third party options that are the best in the industry and offer a level of privacy our users deserve. In this new privacy policy we try to give you as much information about those third-party services as we can.

    GDPR data management: We added a clear, dedicated process for users in the EU and elsewhere to request deletion of their personal data. Email info@eff.org with the subject line “GDPR Data Deletion Request” and we’ll respond within the legally required timeframe.

    Data retention: We reorganized and clarified how long we keep different types of records (communications, financial records, donation paperwork) into a cleaner list. The substance is unchanged, but the structure should make it easier to find what’s relevant to you.

    Action Center: You may notice that the previous policy included a dedicated section on our Action Center – how we handled your campaign participation data, what we retained, and so on. That section is gone because we’re transitioning our campaign tools to a third-party provider. This is the kind of situation the new third-party transparency language addresses: that provider operates under its own privacy policy, which we’ll link to in its dedicated Privacy Guide. Our commitment to your privacy in those contexts doesn’t change‚ it just lives in a different place now.

    What Hasn’t Changed

    The fundamentals remain what they’ve always been: we don’t sell your information, we don’t share it with third parties without your real (not manufactured or dark-patterned) consent, outside of legal requirements we cannot change. We actively push back on legal demands we believe are improper. EFF’s mission is to protect your digital rights, and our own practices will continue to reflect that. The changes we’ve described above will help us in that mission.

    support EFF

    You can read the full updated policy at eff.org/policy. If you have questions, we’re always reachable at info@eff.org.

  • We Must Not Normalize Digital Surveillance Abuses. EFF’s New Guide Underlines Concrete Steps to Fight Back.

    Poor accountability, feeble control mechanisms, and insufficient legal frameworks have led to systematic human rights violations in the Americas, with no consistent remedy or reparation to victims. What’s needed is to materialize essential guarantees and measures to combat repeated surveillance abuses in the region. To help build a path for solutions, EFF launches the guide Tackling Arbitrary Digital Surveillance in the Americas, adding to our extensive work leveraging human rights norms to confront state privacy violations.

    The document compiles privacy, data protection, and access to information guarantees established within the Inter-American Human Rights System to provide concrete, actionable guidance to governments in the Americas to curb the vicious cycle of state digital surveillance abuses. It outlines the safeguards and institutional measures necessary to protect individuals and details rules, parameters, and standards to overcome current pernicious practices and trends. 

    As concerns over national and public security intensify, countries in the region seem to increasingly normalize the pervasiveness of digital surveillance technologies and their arbitrary use by security forces as a distorted form of protection. However, no actual protection can arise from arbitrary surveillance. 

    When public security, intelligence, and law enforcement agencies neglect or harm settled rights in the name of national security or public order, they too become a threat. Tolerating rights violations creates the dire situation that the Freedom of Expression Special Rapporteur of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights thoroughly analyzed in his report about the serious impacts of digital surveillance on freedom of expression in the Americas.

    The great majority of states in Latin America have ratified the American Convention on Human Rights. As such, the parameters and rules our new guide describes stem directly from their obligations before international human rights law. State agents and institutions must take the necessary measures to make them a reality.

    As EFF’s guide points out, states must implement clear and precise legal frameworks that:

    • define surveillance powers and limitations;
    • ensure all surveillance measures pursue legitimate aims without discriminatory ends;
    • subject interference with privacy to rigorous necessity and proportionality analysis;
    • require prior judicial authorization for digital surveillance measures;
    • maintain detailed records of surveillance operations;
    • establish independent civilian oversight institutions with technical expertise and enforcement powers;
    • guarantee individuals’ right to informational self-determination and proper notification; and
    • provide effective remedies and reparation for victims of surveillance abuses.

    States must also put in place the institutional processes and structures to give effect to these legal guarantees. As we stress in the document, States that embrace the guide’s recommendations will not only comply with their international obligations, but will also build more resilient, rights-respecting security architectures capable of addressing genuine threats without sacrificing the freedoms they exist to protect. 

    Civil society leaders, activists, legal experts, public defenders, oversight institutions, and state officials committed to human rights must gather and ramp up the fight against the normalization of digital surveillance abuses in the Americas. We hope that EFF’s new guide can serve as a crucial tool in strengthening this fight, one that we have joined since our early days.

  • Colombia Seizes Belgian Aristocrat’s Hotel Empire

    Colombian authorities have taken possession of 11 luxury assets, including five high-end boutique hotels, from Belgian aristocrat Henri de Croÿ as part of an asset forfeiture process targeting a transnational money laundering network, officials said.

    The state-run Special Assets Society (Sociedad de Activos Especiales (SAE) – in charge of managing forfeited assets – seized the properties in Cartagena and Barú, in the north of the country, following a court-ordered precautionary measure sought by a specialized asset forfeiture unit with Attorney General’s Office.

    The sweeping judicial action targets the corporate structures of Casa Córdoba S.A.S., Persoc Group and Falur Corp. Legal measures were also levied individually against de Croÿ’s wife, Maria del Rosario Patiño Córdoba, a Colombian citizen originally from Popayán.

    Among the seized commercial holdings are five distinct boutique hotels: Hotel Casa Barú, Hotel Casa Córdoba Estrella, Hotel Casa Córdoba Román, Hotel Casa Córdoba Cuartel and the events space Hotel Casa Córdoba Cabal. Authorities also seized three commercial vehicles registered to the network, including a 2020 Foton pickup truck and two 2021 TVS motorized tricycles.

    The state’s enforcement action builds directly on a landmark June 2022 investigation published by OCCRP and its Colombian partner, 070, a media outlet out of the University of the Andes. Titled “How a Belgian Aristocrat Under Investigation for Money Laundering Moved Millions Into Colombia,” the investigation documented how de Croÿ discreetly built a secret real estate network in the Colombian Caribbean while actively under the radar of European justice authorities.

    Drawing on thousands of corporate registries, emails and notary files, the 2022 investigation revealed that de Croÿ used offshore companies, tax havens and complex corporate structures to conceal the true ownership of his assets and move funds allegedly derived from tax fraud. Until the investigation’s publication, European investigators tracking de Croÿ were entirely unaware of his multi-million dollar Colombian holdings.

    De Croÿ, a descendant of European nobility often dubbed the “Black Prince,” first drew widespread international law enforcement scrutiny during the 2018 “Dubai Papers” leak. The leaked files exposed Helin International, a financial services network he operated. Colombian authorities noted the firm remains under investigation in Belgium, France and Switzerland for orchestrating large-scale tax evasion on behalf of scores of rich clients and money laundering.

    While de Croÿ holds Belgian, French and Colombian citizenship and faces no criminal convictions in Colombia, authorities initiated the asset forfeiture under suspicion that the real estate portfolio was funded by illicit capital moved to South America to shield it from international scrutiny.

    With the successful execution of the seizure, the hospitality network will remain under state administration while final legal proceedings determine its permanent disposition.

  • LGBTIQ+ face mounting violence and discrimination, warns UN rights chief

    Violence and discrimination against LGBTIQ+ people are widespread, including at school, where 45 per cent of LGBT youth report being bullied.